HermiCache: Enclave-Aware Cache Replacement for Trusted Execution Environments

📅 2026-09-09
📈 Citations: 0
Influential: 0
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🤖 AI Summary
为解决TEE中的缓存侧信道攻击问题,本文提出HermiCache,一种针对RISC-V核心设计的缓存替换策略,提供细粒度配置与确定性保护。
📝 Abstract
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) protect enclave memory from untrusted software but remain vulnerable to cache-based side-channel attacks due to shared microarchitectural resources. Existing countermeasures use techniques such as cache partitioning or randomization: these solutions are not ideal if a designer wants fine-grained configurations and a deterministic protection. In this paper, we introduce HermiCache which is an answer to these requirements. HermiCache is designed for RISC-V cores and has been implemented in the OpenHwGroup CVA6 core with a Keystone TEE for the software layer. The solution has an area overhead of 6% on the processor core.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

Trusted Execution Environments
cache-based side-channel attacks
fine-grained configurations
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

HermiCache
Trusted Execution Environments
Cache Replacement
Side-Channel Attacks
RISC-V
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