Uncertainty-Aware Jamming Mitigation with Active RIS: A Robust Stackelberg Game Approach

2026-02-20

AI Summary

This work addresses the threat posed by adaptive malicious jamming to secure communications under channel state information (CSI) uncertainty by proposing an active reconfigurable intelligent surface (ARIS)-assisted robust anti-jamming scheme. A Stackelberg game is formulated with the legitimate transmitter as the leader and the jammer as the follower, and equilibrium strategies are derived via backward induction. Notably, CSI uncertainty is explicitly incorporated into the ARIS-assisted framework for the first time, and a robust optimization model is developed based on worst-case channel error bounds. The joint design of transmit power allocation, transceiver beamforming, and ARIS reflection coefficients is efficiently solved using the block successive upper-bound minimization (BSUM) algorithm. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed method significantly outperforms baseline approaches under channel uncertainty, effectively safeguarding legitimate communication performance.

Technology Category

• Multiagent Systems: Multiagent Systems under Uncertainty
• Planning, Routing, and Scheduling: Scheduling under Uncertainty
• Search and Optimization: Adversarial Search

Application Category

• User Modeling, Personalization and Recommendation: Attacks and countermeasures in recommendation systems
• Security and Privacy: Security and privacy of machine learning and AI applications
• Systems and Infrastructure for Web, Mobile and WoT: Applied ML and AI for Web-based mobile applications

Abstract

Malicious jamming presents a pervasive threat to the secure communications, where the challenge becomes increasingly severe due to the growing capability of the jammer allowing the adaptation to legitimate transmissions. This paper investigates the jamming mitigation by leveraging an active reconfigurable intelligent surface (ARIS), where the channel uncertainties are particularly addressed for robust anti-jamming design. Towards this issue, we adopt the Stackelberg game formulation to model the strategic interaction between the legitimate side and the adversary, acting as the leader and follower, respectively. We prove the existence of the game equilibrium and adopt the backward induction method for equilibrium analysis. We first derive the optimal jamming policy as the follower's best response, which is then incorporated into the legitimate-side optimization for robust anti-jamming design. We address the uncertainty issue and reformulate the legitimate-side problem by exploiting the error bounds to combat the worst-case jamming attacks. The problem is decomposed within a block successive upper bound minimization (BSUM) framework to tackle the power allocation, transceiving beamforming, and active reflection, respectively, which are iterated towards the robust jamming mitigation scheme. Simulation results are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in protecting the legitimate transmissions under uncertainties, and the superior performance in terms of jamming mitigation as compared with the baselines.

Problem

• jamming mitigation
• channel uncertainty
• secure communications
• active RIS
• robust design

Innovation

• Active RIS
• Stackelberg game
• Channel uncertainty
• Robust anti-jamming
• BSUM