Comparison of Deterministic Information Providers

๐Ÿ“… 2026-09-16
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๐Ÿ“ Abstract
We analyze incomplete-information games where an oracle publicly shares information with players. One oracle dominates another if, in every game, it can match the set of equilibrium outcomes induced by the latter. Characterizations are provided for deterministic signaling functions, based on simultaneous posterior matching, a constructive partition criterion, and common knowledge components. This study elaborates on the work of Blackwell (1951) in games with incomplete information, using the common knowledge components of Aumann (1976).
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

incomplete-information games
oracle
equilibrium outcomes
deterministic signaling functions
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

deterministic signaling functions
simultaneous posterior matching
constructive partition criterion
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