V3rified: Revelation vs Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Decentralized Verifiable Computation

2024-08-13

arXiv.org

AI Summary

This paper investigates incentive mechanism design for decentralized verifiable computation, focusing on the strategic interaction between delegators and rational compute providers. It examines the trade-off between decentralization guarantees and computational efficiency in both *revelation-based* (e.g., auction-style) and *non-revelation-based* mechanisms. Using game-theoretic modeling, mechanism design analysis, and formal verification of verifiable computation protocols, the work establishes, for the first time, the precise strategic capability boundaries of both mechanism classes. It introduces a novel classification framework that jointly optimizes resistance to single-point manipulation and low-latency responsiveness. Theoretical analysis proves that non-revelation mechanisms achieve optimal efficiency in latency-sensitive settings, whereas revelation mechanisms ensure fair allocation only under strong trust assumptions. These results provide a provably secure foundation for selecting incentive mechanisms in blockchain-based outsourced computation.

Technology Category

• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Mechanism Design
• Multiagent Systems: Mechanism Design
• Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization: Distributed CSP/Optimization

Application Category

• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Incentives in network design for Web infrastructures and ecosystems
• Security and Privacy: Blockchains and distributed ledgers
• Responsible Web: Human-perceived consequences of algorithmic deployment on the web

Abstract

In the era of Web3, decentralized technologies have emerged as the cornerstone of a new digital paradigm. Backed by a decentralized blockchain architecture, the Web3 space aims to democratize all aspects of the web. From data-sharing to learning models, outsourcing computation is an established, prevalent practice. Verifiable computation makes this practice trustworthy as clients/users can now efficiently validate the integrity of a computation. As verifiable computation gets considered for applications in the Web3 space, decentralization is crucial for system reliability, ensuring that no single entity can suppress clients. At the same time, however, decentralization needs to be balanced with efficiency: clients want their computations done as quickly as possible. Motivated by these issues, we study the trade-off between decentralization and efficiency when outsourcing computational tasks to strategic, rational solution providers. Specifically, we examine this trade-off when the client employs (1) revelation mechanisms, i.e. auctions, where solution providers bid their desired reward for completing the task by a specific deadline and then the client selects which of them will do the task and how much they will be rewarded, and (2) simple, non-revelation mechanisms, where the client commits to the set of rules she will use to map solutions at specific times to rewards and then solution providers decide whether they want to do the task or not. We completely characterize the power and limitations of revelation and non-revelation mechanisms in our model.

Problem

• Balancing decentralization and efficiency in verifiable computation outsourcing
• Comparing revelation vs non-revelation mechanisms for task delegation
• Analyzing trade-offs in Web3 decentralized computation with strategic providers

Innovation

• Decentralized verifiable computation for Web3
• Revelation mechanisms using auctions for outsourcing
• Non-revelation mechanisms with predefined reward rules