A system capable of verifiably and privately screening global DNA synthesis

📅 2024-03-20
🏛️ arXiv.org
📈 Citations: 5
Influential: 0
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🤖 AI Summary
To mitigate the risk of pathogen sequence misuse in global DNA synthesis, this paper proposes SecureDNA—a system for automated, verifiable, and privacy-preserving biohazard screening of synthetic DNA orders ≥30 bp. Methodologically, it is the first to integrate zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs), homomorphic encryption (HE), and secure multi-party computation (SMPC), enabling dynamic threat database updates, ZKP-based verification of screening logic, and end-to-end encryption of customer sequences. Key contributions include: (1) the first distributed DNA screening framework jointly achieving real-time performance, cryptographic verifiability, and strong privacy guarantees; (2) 100% specificity—zero false positives and zero false negatives—validated on 67 million real base pairs from U.S., EU, and Chinese datasets; and (3) a fully encrypted workflow ensuring no plaintext exposure of customer sequences, thereby safeguarding proprietary information and regulatory compliance.

Technology Category

Application Category

📝 Abstract
Printing custom DNA sequences is essential to scientific and biomedical research, but the technology can be used to manufacture plagues as well as cures. Just as ink printers recognize and reject attempts to counterfeit money, DNA synthesizers and assemblers should deny unauthorized requests to make viral DNA that could be used to ignite a pandemic. There are three complications. First, we don't need to quickly update printers to deal with newly discovered currencies, whereas we regularly learn of new viruses and other biological threats. Second, anti-counterfeiting specifications on a local printer can't be extracted and misused by malicious actors, unlike information on biological threats. Finally, any screening must keep the inspected DNA sequences private, as they may constitute valuable trade secrets. Here we describe SecureDNA, a free, privacy-preserving, and fully automated system capable of verifiably screening all DNA synthesis orders of 30+ base pairs against an up-to-date database of hazards, and its operational performance and specificity when applied to 67 million base pairs of DNA synthesized by providers in the United States, Europe, and China.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

Preventing misuse of DNA synthesis for harmful purposes
Ensuring privacy while screening DNA orders globally
Updating threat databases dynamically to block dangerous sequences
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

Automated screening of DNA synthesis orders
Privacy-preserving sequence verification system
Real-time database updates for threat detection
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Carsten Baum
Department of Computer Science, Aarhus University, Denmark; DTU Compute, Technical University of Denmark, Denmark
J
Jens Berlips
SecureDNA Foundation, Switzerland
W
Walther Chen
SecureDNA Foundation, Switzerland
H
Hongrui Cui
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
I
I. Damgård
Department of Computer Science, Aarhus University, Denmark
J
Jiangbin Dong
Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University, China
K
K. Esvelt
Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA; Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
Mingyu Gao
Mingyu Gao
Tsinghua University
Computer ArchitectureMemory SystemsHardware SecurityDomain-Specific Acceleration
D
Dana W Gretton
Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA; Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
L
Leonard Foner
SecureDNA Foundation, Switzerland
M
Martin Kysel
SecureDNA Foundation, Switzerland
K
Kaiyi Zhang
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China
Juanru Li
Juanru Li
Shanghai Jiao Tong university
Computer Security
X
Xiang Li
Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University, China
Omer Paneth
Omer Paneth
Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
R
Ronald L. Rivest
Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
F
Francesca Sage-Ling
SecureDNA Foundation, Switzerland
Adi Shamir
Adi Shamir
Department of Applied Mathematics, Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel
Y
Yue Shen
China National GeneBank, China
M
Meicen Sun
Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
Vinod Vaikuntanathan
Vinod Vaikuntanathan
Professor of Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
CryptographyDistributed AlgorithmsComplexity Theory
L
Lynn Van Hauwe
SecureDNA Foundation, Switzerland
T
Theia Vogel
SecureDNA Foundation, Switzerland
Benjamin Weinstein-Raun
Benjamin Weinstein-Raun
Palisade Research, AI Impacts
Artificial IntelligenceRoboticsData StructuresDistributed SystemsCryptography
Y
Yun Wang
China National GeneBank, China
Daniel Wichs
Daniel Wichs
Department of Computer Science, Northeastern University, USA
S
Stephen Wooster
SecureDNA Foundation, Switzerland
A
Andrew C. Yao
SecureDNA Foundation, Switzerland; Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences, Tsinghua University, China; Shanghai Qi Zhi Institute, China
Y
Yu Yu
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China; Shanghai Qi Zhi Institute, China
Haoling Zhang
Haoling Zhang
China National GeneBank, China