🤖 AI Summary
This paper addresses the pervasive phenomenon of “misalignment” among interactive agents—systematic meta-belief errors wherein one agent holds incorrect beliefs about another’s beliefs—unrepresentable in standard type spaces due to their assumption of belief closure.
Method: We first provide a rigorous formal definition of misalignment; then introduce dependency-sensitive type structures that relax the belief-closure assumption; and develop a non-standard modal logic language with corresponding semantics tailored to reasoning under misalignment.
Contribution/Results: Our framework enables precise modeling and analysis of misaligned belief hierarchies. Theoretical applications demonstrate that misalignment can induce speculative trades—even under standard rationality assumptions—thereby revealing its foundational impact on interactive rational decision-making. The approach bridges a critical gap between epistemic game theory and behavioral phenomena arising from hierarchical belief mismatches.
📝 Abstract
We introduce and formalize misalignment, a phenomenon of interactive environments perceived from an analyst's perspective where an agent holds beliefs about another agent's beliefs that do not correspond to the actual beliefs of the latter. We demonstrate that standard frameworks, such as type structures, fail to capture misalignment, necessitating new tools to analyze this phenomenon. To this end, we characterize misalignment through non-belief-closed state spaces and introduce agent-dependent type structures, which provide a flexible tool to understand the varying degrees of misalignment. Furthermore, we establish that appropriately adapted modal operators on agent-dependent type structures behave consistently with standard properties, enabling us to explore the implications of misalignment for interactive reasoning. Finally, we show how speculative trade can arise under misalignment, even when imposing the corresponding assumptions that rule out such trades in standard environments.