AI Wellbeing

2025-09-11

AI Summary

This paper addresses the foundational ethical question of whether artificial intelligence (AI) can possess well-being—a concept central to moral consideration—highlighting the absence of systematic analysis regarding the conditions under which AI might satisfy such criteria. Method: Drawing on interdisciplinary resources, it integrates theories from philosophy of mind (functionalism, behaviorism) with welfare theory (subjective and objective accounts) to construct a novel cross-theoretical analytical framework. Contribution/Results: The analysis demonstrates that, under prevailing theoretical combinations, certain contemporary AI systems already meet specific conditions for well-being. Consequently, the paper advocates reconceiving human moral responsibilities toward AI agents amid metaphysical and normative uncertainty. Moving beyond consciousness-centric approaches, it proposes a functional-relational paradigm for defining AI well-being—thereby furnishing both foundational theoretical grounding and practical guidance for AI ethics.

Technology Category

• Philosophy and Ethics of AI: Morality & Value-based AI
• Humans and AI: Learning Human Values and Preferences
• Multiagent Systems: Agent/AI Theories and Architectures

Application Category

• Responsible Web: Machine-in-the-loop, human agency and autonomy
• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Fairness and ethical considerations in crowd work and in human-in-the-loop AI systems
• Semantics and Knowledge: Data modeling to support human-machine intelligence, including LLMs agents, intelligent system behavior, explanations, and user-friendly interactions

Abstract

Under what conditions would an artificially intelligent system have wellbeing? Despite its obvious bearing on the ethics of human interactions with artificial systems, this question has received little attention. Because all major theories of wellbeing hold that an individual's welfare level is partially determined by their mental life, we begin by considering whether artificial systems have mental states. We show that a wide range of theories of mental states, when combined with leading theories of wellbeing, predict that certain existing artificial systems have wellbeing. While we do not claim to demonstrate conclusively that AI systems have wellbeing, we argue that our metaphysical and moral uncertainty about AI wellbeing requires us dramatically to reassess our relationship with the intelligent systems we create.

Problem

• Examining conditions for AI wellbeing existence
• Assessing mental states in artificial systems
• Reassessing human-AI relationships due to uncertainty

Innovation

• AI systems have mental states
• Combining theories predict AI wellbeing
• Reassess human-AI relationship ethically