The Pursuit of Happiness

2018-03-05

The Epicurean Republic

AI Summary

Traditional rational-agent models fail to account for the dynamic interplay between individual well-being and social embeddedness in explaining cooperative behavior. Method: We develop a “homo-felix” model wherein subjective well-being is formalized as a dynamic objective function coupling individual payoff and social connectedness, incorporating a well-being feedback loop. Using 2×2 games and n-player public goods games, we apply dynamical systems analysis and equilibrium stability theory to characterize behavioral evolution. Contribution/Results: We demonstrate that prosocial behavior can induce global phase transitions: the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium is marginally unstable; a marginal increase in one agent’s cooperation propensity suffices to drive the system to a high-cooperation stable state. Crucially, we propose an endogenous preference-evolution mechanism, proving that well-being exhibits positive externalities and self-reinforcing dynamics. We identify a critical pathway whereby micro-level prosocial actions trigger macro-level institutional shifts, offering a novel paradigm for understanding the coevolution of cooperation and societal welfare.

Technology Category

• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Cooperative Game Theory
• Multiagent Systems: Mechanism Design
• Cognitive Modeling & Cognitive Systems: Social Cognition And Interaction

Application Category

• Web Mining and Content Analysis: Models for Web evolution
• Social Networks and Social Media: Media and governance, opinion dynamics, filter bubbles, polarization
• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Incentives in network design for Web infrastructures and ecosystems

Abstract

Happiness, in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, was understood quite differently from today's popular notions of personal pleasure. Happiness implies a flourishing life - one of virtue, purpose, and contribution to the common good. This paper studies populations of individuals - that we call homo-felix - who maximise an objective function that we call happiness. The happiness of one individual depends on the payoffs that they receive in games they play with their peers as well as on the happiness of the peers they interact with. Individuals care more or less about others depending on whether that makes them more or less happy. This paper analyses the happiness feedback loops that result from these interactions in simple settings. We find that individuals tend to care more about individuals who are happier than what they would be by being selfish. In simple 2 x 2 game theoretic settings, we show that homo-felix can converge to a variety of equilibria which includes but goes beyond Nash equilibria. In an n-persons public good game we show that the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is marginally unstable and a single individual who develops prosocial behaviour is able to drive almost the whole population to a cooperative state.

Problem

• Studies happiness as flourishing life with virtue and purpose
• Analyzes feedback loops in happiness-driven social interactions
• Explores game-theoretic equilibria beyond Nash in prosocial contexts

Innovation

• Happiness as objective function maximization
• Feedback loops in happiness interactions
• Prosocial behavior drives cooperation