π€ AI Summary
This study addresses the problem that AI agents may misinterpret option menus in decision recommendation settings, leading to recommendations misaligned with the decision makerβs true preferences. To resolve this, the paper proposes a choice model grounded in agentic artificial intelligence, which jointly rationalizes recommendation behavior through a strict preference relation and a monotonic interpretation mechanism. The authors innovatively introduce dual monotonicity conditions to ensure full identifiability and internal consistency of preferences, while imposing an idempotence constraint to guarantee fully rational recommendations consistent with the feasible set. Under a single acyclicity assumption, the approach successfully rationalizes AI-generated recommendations, and alignment between AI behavior and the decision makerβs preferences is effectively verified through the interplay of dual monotonicity and idempotence.
π Abstract
This paper proposes a model of choice via agentic artificial intelligence (AI). A key feature is that the AI may misinterpret a menu before recommending what to choose. A single acyclicity condition guarantees that there is a monotonic interpretation and a strict preference relation that together rationalize the AI's recommendations. Since this preference is in general not unique, there is no safeguard against it misaligning with that of a decision maker. What enables the verification of such AI alignment is interpretations satisfying double monotonicity. Indeed, double monotonicity ensures full identifiability and internal consistency. But, an additional idempotence property is required to guarantee that recommendations are fully rational and remain grounded within the original feasible set.