Linearly Solvable Continuous-Time General-Sum Stochastic Differential Games

📅 2026-04-08
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🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses the challenge of solving nonlinear Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations arising in continuous-time multi-agent general-sum and stochastic differential games, particularly in spatial conflict scenarios such as congestion avoidance. The paper introduces, for the first time, a generalized multivariate Cole-Hopf transformation to exactly linearize the coupled nonlinear HJB system into a tractable set of linear partial differential equations. This is achieved by constructing a distributional planning model based on cross log-likelihood ratios. By integrating the Feynman-Kac path integral representation with mesh-free numerical methods, the approach enables efficient computation of high-dimensional feedback Nash equilibrium strategies, effectively circumventing the curse of dimensionality.
📝 Abstract
This paper introduces a class of continuous-time, finite-player stochastic general-sum differential games that admit solutions through an exact linear PDE system. We formulate a distribution planning game utilizing the cross-log-likelihood ratio to naturally model multi-agent spatial conflicts, such as congestion avoidance. By applying a generalized multivariate Cole-Hopf transformation, we decouple the associated non-linear Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations into a system of linear partial differential equations. This reduction enables the efficient, grid-free computation of feedback Nash equilibrium strategies via the Feynman-Kac path integral method, effectively overcoming the curse of dimensionality.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

stochastic differential games
general-sum
multi-agent spatial conflicts
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations
curse of dimensionality
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

linearly solvable games
Cole-Hopf transformation
stochastic differential games
Feynman-Kac formula
feedback Nash equilibrium
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M
Monika Tomar
Edwardson School of Industrial Engineering, School of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Elmore Family School of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA
Takashi Tanaka
Takashi Tanaka
Purdue University
ControlAutonomyInformation Theory