๐ค AI Summary
This study addresses inefficiencies, excessive emissions, and spatial inequity arising from uneven demand distribution in multimodal transportation systems. To reconcile conflicting objectives among stakeholders, the paper proposes the first dual-agent deep reinforcement learning framework that jointly optimizes dynamic pricing and spatiotemporal incentives. One agent represents public authorities, aiming to enhance equity and sustainability through targeted incentives, while the other embodies mobility service providers, dynamically adjusting prices to maximize revenue. Simulation results demonstrate that, during the three-hour morning peak period, the proposed approach reduces commutersโ travel costs by approximately 20% and carbon emissions by 10%, nearly doubles public transit operator profits, effectively flattens demand peaks, and promotes a more equitable distribution of mobility benefits.
๐ Abstract
In multimodal transportation systems, shared mobility services (SMSs) are promoted for their potential to enhance flexibility and reduce congestion. However, SMS demand is often concentrated in high-density areas, which can limit the effectiveness and accessibility for various commuter groups. This uneven integration challenges transportation system efficiency, especially in terms of emissions and spatial equity. Addressing these issues requires coordination among multiple stakeholders whose objectives frequently conflict. Whereas authorities aim to ensure sustainable and equitable mobility, SMS providers focus on revenue maximization, and travelers seek to minimize personal travel costs. This paper proposes a multi-agent deep reinforcement learning framework that captures these interactions through dynamic pricing and incentivization strategies for SMSs and public transport. The framework integrates two reinforcement learning (RL) agents: (i) a public authority that allocates spatio-temporal public transport incentives to improve equity, emissions, and efficiency, and (ii) an SMS provider that dynamically adjusts fares to optimize revenue. The agents interact with the transportation system and adapt strategies in response to evolving demand, congestion, and network conditions. Numerical experiments conducted over a three-hour morning peak period show that dynamic incentivization effectively reduces congestion peaks, lowers commuters' costs by around 20% and emissions by approximately 10%, while nearly doubling public transport profit and supporting a more equitable distribution of benefits. When combined with dynamic SMS pricing, the two RL agents demonstrate the ability to balance conflicting objectives between private providers and public authorities. The proposed approach provides a decision-support tool for sustainable and equitable multimodal mobility planning.