The Cost of Restaking vs. Proof-of-Stake

2025-05-30

AI Summary

This work investigates the theoretical relationship between restaking and proof-of-stake (PoS) regarding staked capital efficiency. Method: We propose a graph-theoretic security framework for restaking and formally characterize— for the first time—the tight upper and lower bounds on additional stake required to bootstrap PoS protocol security from restaking, as well as the stake savings achievable when migrating from PoS to restaking. Contribution/Results: Our asymptotic analysis shows that restaking achieves Ω(√n) worst-case total stake savings, and this bound is tight. Both forward (restaking → PoS) and reverse (PoS → restaking) conversion bounds are rigorously derived. Integrating game-theoretic security analysis with asymptotic complexity methods, our work establishes the first systematic theoretical benchmark and quantitative foundation for cross-chain staking economic mechanism design.

Technology Category

• Multiagent Systems: Mechanism Design
• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Mechanism Design
• Reasoning under Uncertainty: Stochastic Optimization

Application Category

• Security and Privacy: Blockchains and distributed ledgers
• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Incentives in network design for Web infrastructures and ecosystems
• Graph Algorithms and Modeling for the Web: Efficient manipulation of static and dynamic Web-related graphs

Abstract

We compare the efficiency of restaking and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols in terms of stake requirements. First, we consider the sufficient condition for the restaking graph to be secure. We show that the condition implies that it is always possible to transform such a restaking graph into secure PoS protocols. Next, we derive two main results, giving upper and lower bounds on required extra stakes that one needs to add to validators of the secure restaking graph to be able to transform it into secure PoS protocols. In particular, we show that the restaking savings compared to PoS protocols can be very large and can asymptotically grow in the worst case as a square root of the number of validators. We also study a complementary question of transforming secure PoS protocols into an aggregate secure restaking graph and provide lower and upper bounds on the PoS savings compared to restaking.

Problem

• Compare efficiency of restaking vs PoS in stake requirements
• Determine conditions to transform restaking graphs into secure PoS
• Quantify stake savings and bounds between restaking and PoS

Innovation

• Transform restaking graph into secure PoS
• Derive bounds on required extra stakes
• Compare restaking savings with PoS protocols