🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses critical limitations of existing backdoor attacks in federated self-supervised learning (FSSL), which rely on a global, uniform trigger that is easily detectable, diluted during model aggregation, and ill-suited to heterogeneous client data. To overcome these challenges, the authors propose an attention-driven, collusive attack framework wherein a coalition of malicious clients decomposes the global trigger during local pretraining, searches for optimal local trigger patterns, and leverages an attention mechanism to dynamically aggregate malicious updates. This approach effectively mitigates the dilution effect caused by benign clients. Notably, it is the first to integrate attention mechanisms into collusive backdoor attacks, replacing global triggers with adaptive local ones to significantly enhance both stealthiness and robustness. Extensive experiments across multiple FSSL settings and four datasets demonstrate substantial improvements in attack success rate and persistence over state-of-the-art methods.
📝 Abstract
Federated Self-Supervised Learning (FSSL) integrates the privacy advantages of distributed training with the capability of self-supervised learning to leverage unlabeled data, showing strong potential across applications. However, recent studies have shown that FSSL is also vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing attacks are limited by their trigger design, which typically employs a global, uniform trigger that is easily detected, gets diluted during aggregation, and lacks robustness in heterogeneous client environments. To address these challenges, we propose the Attention-Driven multi-party Collusion Attack (ADCA). During local pre-training, malicious clients decompose the global trigger to find optimal local patterns. Subsequently, these malicious clients collude to form a malicious coalition and establish a collaborative optimization mechanism within it. In this mechanism, each submits its model updates, and an attention mechanism dynamically aggregates them to explore the best cooperative strategy. The resulting aggregated parameters serve as the initial state for the next round of training within the coalition, thereby effectively mitigating the dilution of backdoor information by benign updates. Experiments on multiple FSSL scenarios and four datasets show that ADCA significantly outperforms existing methods in Attack Success Rate (ASR) and persistence, proving its effectiveness and robustness.