🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses the vulnerability of Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) to covert flooding attacks in military medical and wearable Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications, which can lead to resource exhaustion and communication disruption. The work presents the first systematic, quantitative evaluation framework that integrates empirical testbeds—such as Raspberry Pi and Flipper Zero—with wireless channel modeling to accurately assess the real-world impact of such attacks in dense IoT environments. Furthermore, it proposes a lightweight defense mechanism based on channel agility that substantially increases the cost of launching successful attacks. Experimental results demonstrate that even low-cost adversarial devices can inflict severe service degradation, whereas the proposed strategy effectively mitigates these threats and enhances system robustness, making it well-suited for resource-constrained battlefield scenarios.
📝 Abstract
The energy-efficient design of the BLE protocol, emphasis on rapid, and userfriendly discovery, making it an ideal choice for IoMTs, specifically, military field medical systems, and battlefield wearable sensors. Especially in active conflict zones, when static medical facilities are vulnerable and often targeted, limiting their viability for sustained care delivery. This rapid deployment, and ease of management comes at the cost of expanded attack surface, i.e., BLE flooding attacks. During such attacks, adversaries flood advertisement channels with unauthorized connection or advertising requests to exhaust nearby device resources and disrupt legitimate communication, sometimes culminating in denial-of-service conditions. A first public proof-of-concept of such attacks, using a Raspberry Pi has since been adapted to commodity platforms (e.g., Flipper Zero, HackRF, Android), lowering the barrier to attack. In contested environments, such platforms are directly relevant to adversarial RF jamming and spoofing operations, where low-cost, portable devices can induce disproportionate disruption in dense wireless ecosystems. In this work, we develop a quantitative foundation for understanding the impact of such attacks and propose a practical deterrence strategy based on agility to raise the cost of such attacks.