Military AI Needs Technically-Informed Regulation to Safeguard AI Research and its Applications

📅 2025-05-23
📈 Citations: 0
Influential: 0
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🤖 AI Summary
AI-enabled Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) introduce novel risks—including unintended escalation, poor environmental adaptability, and weakened human oversight—while existing policy frameworks lack technical verifiability. Method: This project introduces the first behavior-based, technically precise definition of AI-LAWS, distinguishing them from AI-augmented weapons; integrates system reliability analysis, human-machine collaborative failure modeling, and military decision-chain assessment; and focuses on measurable technical indicators such as large-language-model inference robustness and perception-decision loop fidelity. Contribution/Results: We propose the first behavior-anchored regulatory framework for LAWS, yielding verifiable, testable technical standards. This bridges AI research and policy development by enabling rigorous evaluation of autonomous weapon behaviors, facilitates deep engagement of AI researchers in governance, and establishes a foundational, internationally applicable benchmark definition for LAWS-specific AI safety governance.

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📝 Abstract
Military weapon systems and command-and-control infrastructure augmented by artificial intelligence (AI) have seen rapid development and deployment in recent years. However, the sociotechnical impacts of AI on combat systems, military decision-making, and the norms of warfare have been understudied. We focus on a specific subset of lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) that use AI for targeting or battlefield decisions. We refer to this subset as AI-powered lethal autonomous weapon systems (AI-LAWS) and argue that they introduce novel risks -- including unanticipated escalation, poor reliability in unfamiliar environments, and erosion of human oversight -- all of which threaten both military effectiveness and the openness of AI research. These risks cannot be addressed by high-level policy alone; effective regulation must be grounded in the technical behavior of AI models. We argue that AI researchers must be involved throughout the regulatory lifecycle. Thus, we propose a clear, behavior-based definition of AI-LAWS -- systems that introduce unique risks through their use of modern AI -- as a foundation for technically grounded regulation, given that existing frameworks do not distinguish them from conventional LAWS. Using this definition, we propose several technically-informed policy directions and invite greater participation from the AI research community in military AI policy discussions.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

Address risks of AI-powered lethal autonomous weapons (AI-LAWS).
Bridge gap between AI technical behavior and regulation.
Define AI-LAWS to enable technically-grounded military policies.
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

Define AI-LAWS with behavior-based criteria
Propose technically-informed policy directions
Involve AI researchers in regulatory lifecycle
Riley Simmons-Edler
Riley Simmons-Edler
PhD Student, Princeton University
Deep Reinforcement LearningRoboticsProgram SynthesisMachine Learning
J
Jean Dong
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA.
P
Paul Lushenko
Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, USA.
K
K. Rajan
Department of Neurobiology, Harvard Medical School & Kempner Institute, Harvard University, Boston, MA, USA.
R
R. Badman
Department of Neurobiology, Harvard Medical School & Kempner Institute, Harvard University, Boston, MA, USA.