🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses the security risk of indirect prompt injection attacks against Gemini models during function calling and tool usage, stemming from integration with untrusted external data. We propose the first adaptive, continuous adversarial evaluation framework tailored for multi-generation Gemini models. Our method integrates dynamic sandbox monitoring, real-time tool permission enforcement, multi-round red-teaming exercises, and robustness quantification metrics—deeply embedding security testing into the model’s iterative development loop. Key innovations include: (1) a transferable, adaptive attack generation mechanism; and (2) fine-grained detection and blocking of malicious instructions within tool interaction chains. Experiments demonstrate that our framework significantly enhances Gemini’s resilience against indirect prompt injection, thereby advancing systematic security assurance for large language models in realistic tool-augmented deployment scenarios.
📝 Abstract
Gemini is increasingly used to perform tasks on behalf of users, where function-calling and tool-use capabilities enable the model to access user data. Some tools, however, require access to untrusted data introducing risk. Adversaries can embed malicious instructions in untrusted data which cause the model to deviate from the user's expectations and mishandle their data or permissions. In this report, we set out Google DeepMind's approach to evaluating the adversarial robustness of Gemini models and describe the main lessons learned from the process. We test how Gemini performs against a sophisticated adversary through an adversarial evaluation framework, which deploys a suite of adaptive attack techniques to run continuously against past, current, and future versions of Gemini. We describe how these ongoing evaluations directly help make Gemini more resilient against manipulation.