Protocol effects on feature-based hardware-Trojan detection across Trust-Hub families

📅 2026-09-07
📈 Citations: 0
Influential: 0
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🤖 AI Summary
研究通过改变测试边界方法,评估了在硬件木马检测中重复使用主机电路对检测效果的影响。
📝 Abstract
Trust-Hub reuses host circuits: several files differ mainly in the inserted Trojan. When gates from sibling variants enter both training and test folds, a detector can benefit from host logic it has already seen. We measure that effect instead of proposing another classifier. The corpus contains 49,124 gates from 16 netlists grouped into five host families. We left the parser, 36 gate features, class weighting, model settings, threshold, and family-level aggregation unchanged and altered one choice: the test boundary. The three settings draw test gates from the pooled corpus, withhold a complete netlist, or withhold every variant of one host. The choice matters. Random forest records F1/AP of 0.914/0.978 with pooled gates, 0.636/0.851 with one netlist held out, and 0.460/0.577 with a host family held out. XGBoost falls from 0.946/0.976 to 0.464/0.544 across the same comparison. Logistic regression loses AP, although its fixed-threshold F1 is not monotonic. Each family shows the same pooled-to-family direction. Feature removal, repeated model and simulator seeds, score normalization, parser-related exclusions, and a smaller sample change the size of the gap without reversing it. Aggregation also matters: a gate-weighted average is dominated by the larger ISCAS files, so the headline values give each host family one vote. Bootstrap and jackknife summaries keep the gap positive, but their folds reuse training families. We treat the five family rows as descriptive evidence rather than independent trials. Five host families are too few for a population claim, and the experiment says nothing about transfer to a new cell library or an industrial design. It supports a narrower conclusion: sibling benchmark variants can inflate apparent transfer. Benchmarks with several variants of one host circuit should report family-aware holdouts and all five family results beside pooled scores.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

hardware-Trojan detection
feature-based
Trust-Hub families
protocol effects
benchmark variants
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

protocol effects
feature-based hardware-Trojan detection
Trust-Hub families
test boundary
family-aware holdouts
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