Problem
Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.
school choice
appeals
Immediate Acceptance
Deferred Acceptance
truth-telling
School Choice with Appeals
🤖 AI Summary
研究探讨了学校选择中的申诉机制如何影响家长报告偏好及分配结果，通过理论分析和实验表明申诉使即时接受法更不易被操纵且效率更高。
📝 Abstract
Roughly fifty thousand families in England appeal their school assignments each year through a centralized and understudied procedure that improves the placement of about one in five claimants. This paper shows that appeals are not an institutional afterthought: they change how parents report preferences to the education authority and the quality of placements it generates. Once the appeal stage is incorporated, Immediate Acceptance (IA) becomes less manipulable and can support equilibrium outcomes that Pareto dominate those of Deferred Acceptance (DA) under truth-telling, reversing the DA-IA welfare comparison. In a preregistered experiment, we find results consistent with the theoretical predictions: appeals increase truth-telling in IA, leaving DA essentially unchanged, and widen the IA-DA efficiency gap. Around 60% of the IA efficiency gain appears before any appeal is upheld, because subjects anticipating the possibility of a potential appeal rank schools differently.
Innovation
Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.
Appeals
Immediate Acceptance (IA)
Deferred Acceptance (DA)
Truth-telling
Efficiency Gap
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