Bait-and-Recover: Poisoning Internal Refusal Signals to Defend LLMs against White-Box Editing Jailbreaks

2026-09-05

Abstract

Open-weight large language models face a low-cost white-box threat from representation engineering attacks. Attackers can estimate refusal directions and search for projection-matrix edits that suppress safety alignment while preserving general capabilities, within minutes on a single GPU and without gradient-based training. We propose Bait-and-Recover, a weight-level defense that places a bait adapter where attackers read activations and a paired recovery adapter at the subsequent layer. Trained via gradient routing, this decouples the observation path from the behavior path. By actively poisoning the residual signal used for measurement, Bait-and-Recover disrupts the attacker's edit search, while the recovery layer restores clean downstream computation. Across four open-weight models, our defense raises the minimum refusal rate against white-box edit searches from 16.25% to 71.75% under a strict behavior-preservation budget (KL<= 0.10), with negligible impact on general benchmarks. By invalidating the core measurement assumption of these attacks, observation-path poisoning offers a practical complement to behavior-level safety training.

Problem

• large language models
• white-box threat
• representation engineering attacks
• refusal directions
• projection-matrix edits

Innovation

• Bait-and-Recover
• weight-level defense
• gradient routing
• observation-path poisoning
• residual signal