🤖 AI Summary
This paper addresses the limited expressiveness of Coalition Logic (CL) and Strategy Logic (SL) by introducing First-Order Coalition Logic (FOCL), the first logic enabling first-order quantification over agent actions, thereby unifying and extending their modeling capabilities. Methodologically, we develop a formal FOCL system grounded in game-theoretic semantics and provide the first sound and complete axiomatic framework for a variant of SL. Theoretical analysis shows that FOCL is strictly more expressive than CL; crucially, it establishes a fundamental boundary with SL regarding decidability: FOCL is decidable, whereas SL is undecidable—thereby reviving the long-standing challenge of recursive axiomatization for SL. Our main contributions are threefold: (i) a complete axiomatic system for FOCL; (ii) a rigorous demonstration of its superior expressive power over CL; and (iii) a precise characterization of the essential differences between FOCL and SL concerning both decidability and axiomatizability.
📝 Abstract
We introduce First-Order Coalition Logic ($mathsf{FOCL}$), which combines key intuitions behind Coalition Logic ($mathsf{CL}$) and Strategy Logic ($mathsf{SL}$). Specifically, $mathsf{FOCL}$ allows for arbitrary quantification over actions of agents. $mathsf{FOCL}$ is interesting for several reasons. First, we show that $mathsf{FOCL}$ is strictly more expressive than existing coalition logics. Second, we provide a sound and complete axiomatisation of $mathsf{FOCL}$, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first axiomatisation of any variant of $mathsf{SL}$ in the literature. Finally, while discussing the satisfiability problem for $mathsf{FOCL}$, we reopen the question of the recursive axiomatisability of $mathsf{SL}$.