🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses the limited robustness of large language models (LLMs) in actively acquiring information under conditions of insufficient data, where existing approaches suffer significant performance degradation in worst-case scenarios. The paper introduces the first formalization of adversarial information seeking as a strategic language search problem, proposing the Game of Thought framework. This framework models the information acquisition process as a two-player zero-sum extensive-form game and optimizes LLM behavior through strategies approximating Nash equilibrium. By integrating game theory, extensive-form game modeling, and prompt search, the method consistently and substantially improves worst-case performance on the Twenty Questions task, outperforming both direct prompting and heuristic search baselines.
📝 Abstract
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world scenarios where they may lack sufficient information to complete a given task. In such settings, the ability to actively seek out missing information becomes a critical capability. Existing approaches to enhancing this ability often rely on simplifying assumptions that degrade \textit{worst-case} performance. This is an issue with serious implications in high-stakes applications. In this work, we use the game of Twenty Questions to evaluate the information-seeking ability of LLMs. We introduce and formalize its adversarial counterpart, the Strategic Language Search (SLS) problem along with its variants as a two-player zero-sum extensive form game. We propose Game of Thought (GoT), a framework that applies game-theoretic techniques to approximate a Nash equilibrium (NE) strategy for the restricted variant of the game. Empirical results demonstrate that our approach consistently improves worst-case performance compared to (1) direct prompting-based methods and (2) heuristic-guided search methods across all tested settings.