"Sail Fast, Then Wait"in First-come, First-served Port Queues: Information Sharing for Sustainable Shipping

2026-02-02

AI Summary

This study addresses the inefficiency and excessive carbon emissions arising from the “sail fast, then wait” (SFTW) behavior of heterogeneous vessels under information asymmetry in first-come-first-served ports. The authors formulate an incomplete-information queuing game to model strategic vessel arrivals within feasible time windows. They uniquely characterize SFTW as the sole symmetric equilibrium in this setting and demonstrate that full information expands the equilibrium set, thereby enabling more environmentally sustainable slow-steaming strategies. Integrating queuing theory, game-theoretic analysis, and empirical data, the research shows that information sharing significantly mitigates SFTW behavior, enhances energy efficiency, and promotes sustainable maritime operations.

Technology Category

• Planning, Routing, and Scheduling: Optimization of Spatio-temporal Systems
• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Imperfect Information
• Search and Optimization: Combinatorial Optimization

Application Category

• Security and Privacy: Large-scale security measurements
• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: The sharing economy
• Graph Algorithms and Modeling for the Web: Efficient manipulation of static and dynamic Web-related graphs

Abstract

This study develops a novel class of queueing game to explain a common practice in cargo shipping"Sail Fast, Then Wait"(SFTW), and demonstrates that resolving information asymmetry among ships can deconcentrate port arrival times. We formulate a competitive navigating environment as an incomplete information game where players strategically decide their arrival time within heterogeneous feasible sets under First-Come, First-Served port policy. Our results show that in incomplete information settings, SFTW emerges as the unique symmetric equilibrium. Conversely, under complete information, the set of equilibria expands, allowing for slower and more environmentally friendly actions without compromising service order. We further quantitatively evaluate the effect of information enrichment based on empirical data. Our findings suggest that the prevalence of technologies enabling ships to infer others'private information can effectively reduce SFTW and enable more energy-efficient and environmentally sustainable operations.

Problem

• Sail Fast Then Wait
• information asymmetry
• port queues
• sustainable shipping
• first-come first-served

Innovation

• queueing game
• information asymmetry
• Sail Fast Then Wait
• sustainable shipping
• first-come first-served