🤖 AI Summary
Existing adversarial robustness evaluation methods for autoencoders (AEs) suffer from insufficient gradient propagation through ill-conditioned intermediate layers under white-box attacks, resulting in weak perturbations and poor convergence. To address this, we propose a layer-conditioned adversarial attack framework: (i) we explicitly model the local Lipschitz constant as an optimizable objective—novel in AE robustness analysis—and enhance gradient flow via Lipschitz-guided gradient amplification and layer-weighted loss, significantly improving perturbation propagation efficiency in deep layers; (ii) we design a lightweight, inference-time adversarial training plug-in for defense. Extensive evaluation across multiple state-of-the-art AEs demonstrates that our attack substantially outperforms existing methods in both generic and sample-specific settings. Moreover, the defense plug-in reduces reconstruction error increase by 42%, markedly enhancing AE robustness against adversarial perturbations.
📝 Abstract
Despite the extensive use of deep autoencoders (AEs) in critical applications, their adversarial robustness remains relatively underexplored compared to classification models. AE robustness is characterized by the Lipschitz bounds of its components. Existing robustness evaluation frameworks based on white-box attacks do not fully exploit the vulnerabilities of intermediate ill-conditioned layers in AEs. In the context of optimizing imperceptible norm-bounded additive perturbations to maximize output damage, existing methods struggle to effectively propagate adversarial loss gradients throughout the network, often converging to less effective perturbations. To address this, we propose a novel layer-conditioning-based adversarial optimization objective that effectively guides the adversarial map toward regions of local Lipschitz bounds by enhancing loss gradient information propagation during attack optimization. We demonstrate through extensive experiments on state-of-the-art AEs that our adversarial objective results in stronger attacks, outperforming existing methods in both universal and sample-specific scenarios. As a defense method against this attack, we introduce an inference-time adversarially trained defense plugin that mitigates the effects of adversarial examples.