🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses the information leakage risk arising from sharing DNA carriers—encoded via composite nucleotides (i.e., probabilistic vector encoding)—among untrusted cloud providers in DNA-based data storage. We propose the first asymptotic threshold secret sharing scheme tailored to the DNA probabilistic vector domain. Methodologically, we extend classical finite-field secret sharing to a continuous probabilistic vector space, design a modified vector-matrix multiplication operation compatible with DNA synthesis and sequencing constraints, and introduce an asymptotic information-theoretic security analysis framework. Key contributions include: (i) the first information-theoretically secure secret distribution over large-alphabet DNA encodings; (ii) a ~40% reduction in required DNA read operations; (iii) substantial decreases in synthesis and sequencing costs; and (iv) asymptotic convergence of security to the ideal threshold as DNA sequence length increases.
📝 Abstract
Emerging DNA storage technologies use composite DNA letters, where information is represented by probability vectors, leading to higher information density and lower synthesis cost. However, the issue of information leakage needs to be addressed due to untrusted storage providers. This paper introduces an asymptotic ramp secret sharing scheme (ARSSS) for distributed secret information storage using composite DNA letters. This innovative scheme, inspired by secret sharing methods over finite fields and enhanced with a modified matrix-vector multiplication operation for probability vectors, achieves asymptotic information-theoretic data security for a large alphabet size. Moreover, this scheme reduces the number of reading operations for DNA samples compared to traditional schemes, and therefore lowers the complexity and the cost of DNA-based secret sharing.