Breaking the Flow and the Bank: Stealthy Cyberattacks on Water Network Hydraulics

2025-04-24

AI Summary

Water distribution networks (WDNs) face growing threats from stealthy false data injection attacks (SFDIAs), which compromise system integrity while evading conventional residual-based detection. Method: This paper proposes a lightweight, locally topology-dependent attack framework that jointly enforces hydraulic consistency and detection evasion by integrating physical water flow equations with sensor statistical modeling within a constrained optimization formulation. Contribution/Results: It quantifies, for the first time, the trade-offs among attack complexity, required system prior knowledge, and operational impacts—including flow deviation and increased energy consumption. Evaluated on benchmark networks Net1 and Net3, the attack remains undetected for hours to days, significantly inflates operational costs, and distorts hydraulic scheduling. The framework provides reproducible, quantitative insights for assessing WDN resilience and informing robust defense design against SFDIAs.

Technology Category

• Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization: Distributed CSP/Optimization
• Search and Optimization: Distributed Search
• Planning, Routing, and Scheduling: Optimization of Spatio-temporal Systems

Application Category

• Systems and Infrastructure for Web, Mobile and WoT: Data management and stream processing for Web, mobile and wireless applications
• Graph Algorithms and Modeling for the Web: Efficient manipulation of static and dynamic Web-related graphs
• User Modeling, Personalization and Recommendation: Attacks and countermeasures in recommendation systems

Abstract

As water distribution networks (WDNs) become increasingly connected with digital infrastructures, they face greater exposure to cyberattacks that threaten their operational integrity. Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks (SFDIAs) are particularly concerning, as they manipulate sensor data to compromise system operations while avoiding detection. While existing studies have focused on either detection methods or specific attack formulations, the relationship between attack sophistication, system knowledge requirements, and achievable impact remains unexplored. This paper presents a systematic analysis of sensor attacks against WDNs, investigating different combinations of physical constraints, state monitoring requirements, and intrusion detection evasion conditions. We propose several attack formulations that range from tailored strategies satisfying both physical and detection constraints to simpler measurement manipulations. The proposed attacks are simple and local -- requiring knowledge only of targeted sensors and their hydraulic connections -- making them scalable and practical. Through case studies on Net1 and Net3 benchmark networks, we demonstrate how these attacks can persistently increase operational costs and alter water flows while remaining undetected by monitoring systems for extended periods. The analysis provides utilities with insights for vulnerability assessment and motivates the development of protection strategies that combine physical and statistical security mechanisms.

Problem

• Study stealthy cyberattacks on water distribution networks.
• Analyze attack impact, detection evasion, and system knowledge.
• Develop scalable attacks bypassing current monitoring systems.

Innovation

• Systematic analysis of sensor attacks on water networks
• Simple local attacks requiring minimal sensor knowledge
• Combines physical constraints with detection evasion conditions