Sequential Pricing Mechanisms for Surplus Division

2026-09-02

AI Summary

研究提出Price-Accept-and-Choose机制以消除Price-and-Choose中的先动优势，并通过随机化和竞价变体实现标准解，如Shapley值。

Abstract

Extending the Price-and-Choose (P&C) mechanism of Echenique and Nunez (2025), we propose the Price-Accept-and-Choose (PA&C) mechanism, which preserves efficiency while eliminating P&C's first-mover advantage. We then analyze randomized and bidding variants and show that the resulting equilibrium payoffs correspond to standard solutions in transferable utility games: the Center of the Imputation Set value for P&C and the Shapley value for PA&C. In the randomized variants, these solutions arise in expectation; in the bidding variants, they are implemented on every equilibrium path. We further relate other efficient designs, such as balanced VCG payments, to additional solution concepts, forging an interpretable bridge between implementation theory and cooperative game theory.

Problem

• Price-and-Choose
• first-mover advantage
• efficiency
• equilibrium payoffs
• transferable utility games

Innovation

• Price-Accept-and-Choose (PA&C)
• first-mover advantage
• Shapley value
• randomized variants
• bidding variants