Problem
Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.
network formation game
centrality
core-periphery networks
Nash equilibrium
Strategic Centrality and the Emergence of Core-Periphery Networks
🤖 AI Summary
研究通过网络形成博弈，分析了节点如何以线性成本赞助链接以最大化中心性，证明了每个纳什均衡网络都是核心-外围结构。
📝 Abstract
We study a network formation game in which agents sponsor links at a linear cost in order to maximize centrality, defined as a weighted sum of walk counts with positive and weakly decreasing weights. This class includes Katz Bonacich centrality and total communicability and captures environments in which access decays with distance. Our main result is a sharp equilibrium characterization: every Nash equilibrium network is core periphery, meaning there exists a set $C$ such that every node is linked to every node in $C$, and there are no other edges. The driving force is that linking to better connected agents generates many additional short connections at once, so incentives concentrate links on a dense subset. Finally, we show that the welfare maximizing network is always either empty or complete.
Innovation
Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.
network formation game
centrality
core-periphery networks
Nash equilibrium
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