Storage-Based Strategic Manipulation of Constraint-Binding Patterns in Power Networks

2026-09-14

AI Summary

研究通过建立斯塔克尔伯格博弈模型，分析了储能聚合商在日前电力市场中的策略行为及其对社会福利的影响，并提出限制不良行为的机制。

Abstract

This paper studies the strategic market participation of a monopolistic energy storage aggregator (ESA) in a day-ahead electricity market. The ESA coordinates geographically distributed storage units, submits a coordinated bid for its portfolio, and may hold financial transmission rights (FTRs). The system operator clears the market through a network-constrained, multi-period economic dispatch, determining generation and load schedules, nodal prices, energy-market payments, and FTR payoffs. We formulate the ESA--system-operator interaction as a Stackelberg game and characterize its equilibrium through a constraint-binding-pattern decomposition of the market-clearing problem. Beyond enabling equilibrium computation, the framework reveals how the ESA can increase its profit by strategically inducing or avoiding particular constraint-binding patterns. It also establishes a novel welfare result: although strategic storage without FTRs is known to weakly improve social welfare relative to the no-storage case, certain FTR positions can overturn this guarantee by strengthening the ESA's incentive to induce particular patterns, causing social welfare to fall below the no-storage level. Motivated by these findings, we develop two system-operator mechanisms for limiting undesirable ESA behavior and its adverse effects on market outcomes and social welfare. Finally, a three-bus study illustrates the theoretical findings, while IEEE test systems demonstrate the scalability of the proposed method.

Problem

• energy storage aggregator
• day-ahead electricity market
• financial transmission rights
• constraint-binding patterns
• social welfare

Innovation

• Storage Aggregator
• Constraint-Binding Patterns
• Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs)
• Stackelberg Game
• Social Welfare