Pick Your Poison: Learning to Select Poison Sets for Stronger LLM Backdoor Attacks

๐Ÿ“… 2026-09-14
๐Ÿ“ˆ Citations: 0
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๐Ÿค– AI Summary
ๆœฌๆ–‡็ ”็ฉถ้€š่ฟ‡้€‰ๆ‹ฉ็‰นๅฎš็š„ๆฏ’ๅฎณๆ•ฐๆฎ้›†ๆฅๅขžๅผบLLMๅŽ้—จๆ”ปๅ‡ป็š„ๆˆๅŠŸ็އ๏ผŒๆๅ‡บไบ†ไธ€็งๅไธบSAILS็š„ๆ–ฐๆ–นๆณ•๏ผŒ่ฏฅๆ–นๆณ•่ƒฝๅคŸไปŽๅ€™้€‰้›†ไธญๆœ‰ๆ•ˆๆŒ‘้€‰ๅ‡บๆœ€่ƒฝๆ้ซ˜ๆ”ปๅ‡ปๆˆๅŠŸ็އ็š„ๆ•ฐๆฎ้›†ใ€‚
๐Ÿ“ Abstract
Backdoor poisoning attacks add poisoned examples to otherwise-clean finetuning data, pairing a trigger with a target behavior that the model learns to produce when the trigger appears. Existing evaluations typically fix the number of poisoned examples and sample them at random from a candidate pool. We show that this can severely underestimate worst-case vulnerability: across three LLaMA-3-8B backdoor settings, holding the model, clean data, and poison count fixed, attack success ranges from 3% to 80% depending only on which poison set is chosen. We formalize poison selection as oracle-budgeted set optimization and introduce SAILS (Set-level Audit-Informed Iterative Learned Selection), which learns a set scorer from a few hundred finetune-and-evaluate runs, ranks millions of candidate sets, and audits only a small shortlist. SAILS improves held-out attack success by 30 percentage points on average over the strongest influence baselines, transfers from small-scale to full-scale finetuning, and extends to code-generation, agentic, and API-only backdoors.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

backdoor poisoning attacks
poisoned examples
attack success
worst-case vulnerability
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

SAILS
poison selection
backdoor attacks
LLM
set optimization