๐ค AI Summary
็ ็ฉถไบๅจๅๅณฐๅๅฅฝไธ็ญ็ฅ่ฏๆ็็คพไผ้ๆฉ้ฎ้ข๏ผ้่ฟๅๅบๆฉๅฑๆฏ่พ้ๅ็ปๆ๏ผๆๅบๅนถๅๆไบไธๅ่งๅไธ็้ๆฉๆบๅถใ
๐ Abstract
We study strategy-proof social choice where agents have single-dipped preferences and outcomes may be sets of alternatives. While point-valued strategy-proof rules select an endpoint, we ask which outcomes survive when sets are compared through responsive extensions. Under the standard responsive extension, preferences over fixed-length intervals remain single-dipped, so the endpoint restriction persists and anonymity yields a single-threshold rule. Under responsive dominance, the incomplete order shared by all responsive extensions, an interior interval can survive because the two extreme intervals need not be comparable. For arbitrary sets, requiring every chosen alternative to be most preferred by some agent yields voting-by-committees rules, with one committee per endpoint; anonymous rules have a two-threshold quota form. The characterization holds on the entire endpoint-peaked domain, and every such rule is group-strategy-proof.