🤖 AI Summary
This study addresses a persistent misconception in legal epistemology that the theory of relative plausibility and probabilistic approaches to judicial proof are inherently opposed. Introducing Marr’s levels-of-analysis framework to legal reasoning for the first time, the paper demonstrates that relative plausibility characterizes the computational task of judicial proof, while probabilistic methods provide algorithmic implementations—thus occupying distinct analytical levels and functioning complementarily rather than competitively. By integrating hierarchical analysis from cognitive science, Bayesian inference, and models of explanatory comparison, the work shows that, under minimal coherence conditions, relative plausibility corresponds to posterior odds. This correspondence unifies explanatory and probabilistic accounts of legal reasoning and resolves longstanding theoretical confusions in the field.
📝 Abstract
Debates about juridical proof are often framed as a conflict between probabilistic approaches and relative plausibility theory (RPT). This paper argues that this opposition rests on a level-of-analysis error. Drawing on Marr's distinction between levels of analysis, we show that RPT and probabilistic approaches operate at different conceptual levels and are therefore compatible rather than competing theories. RPT provides a computational-level description of juridical proof, characterizing the task of comparing explanations in light of the evidence and assessing whether a standard of proof has been met. Probabilistic approaches supply algorithmic-level accounts that specify how such comparative assessments can be represented and computed. When plausibility judgments satisfy minimal coherence conditions, relative plausibility corresponds to posterior odds. Recognizing this distinction clarifies longstanding disputes and highlights the complementary roles of explanation and probability in legal reasoning.