Economic feasibility of virtual operators in 5G via network slicing

2020-08-01

Future generations computer systems

AI Summary

This study investigates incentive-compatible business models between infrastructure-holding network operators and infrastructure-less virtual operators in the context of 5G network slicing. It proposes two distinct models—strategic and monopolistic—and, for the first time, integrates a system performance model of network slicing with an economic game-theoretic framework. Resource allocation is characterized using discriminatory processor-sharing queues, and the interplay between user subscription behavior and operator pricing is analyzed through non-cooperative game theory. The findings demonstrate that the strategic model significantly enhances user subscription rates, while both models provide sufficient economic incentives for network operators to open their infrastructure to virtual operators, thereby achieving a mutually beneficial outcome for all stakeholders.

Technology Category

• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Cooperative Game Theory
• Planning, Routing, and Scheduling: Scheduling under Uncertainty
• Multiagent Systems: Mechanism Design

Application Category

• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Incentives in network design for Web infrastructures and ecosystems
• Systems and Infrastructure for Web, Mobile and WoT: Virtualization and resource management in Web systems and infrastructures
• User Modeling, Personalization and Recommendation: Accountability, Transparency, and Ethics for personalization

Problem

• 5G network slicing
• virtual operator
• economic feasibility
• network infrastructure sharing
• business model

Innovation

• network slicing
• virtual operator
• Discriminatory Processor Sharing
• game theory
• 5G economics