π€ AI Summary
This paper addresses the robust Pareto-optimal reinsurance design problem between multiple heterogeneous risk-averse primary insurers and a single reinsurer in a monopoly market, where the joint loss distribution is unknown and only marginal distributions are available. Methodologically, it introduces a novel robust optimization framework based on the Range Value-at-Risk (RVaR) family of risk measures. It fully characterizes the worst-case dependence structure and derives the optimal indemnity function in closed form, reducing the infinite-dimensional optimization to a finite-dimensional problem with only two or three parameters. For i.i.d. risks, it constructs analytically tractable, two-tier asymptotically optimal reinsurance contracts. The theoretical analysis reveals how dependence uncertainty and insurer heterogeneity critically influence reinsurance allocation and systemic risk assessment. Numerical experiments demonstrate the methodβs effectiveness and practical applicability.
π Abstract
This paper studies Pareto-optimal reinsurance design in a monopolistic market with multiple primary insurers and a single reinsurer, all with heterogeneous risk preferences. The risk preferences are characterized by a family of risk measures, called Range Value-at-Risk (RVaR), which includes both Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) as special cases. Recognizing the practical difficulty of accurately estimating the dependence structure among the insurers' losses, we adopt a robust optimization approach that assumes the marginal distributions are known while leaving the dependence structure unspecified. We provide a complete characterization of optimal indemnity schedules under the worst-case scenario, showing that the infinite-dimensional optimization problem can be reduced to a tractable finite-dimensional problem involving only two or three parameters for each indemnity function. Additionally, for independent and identically distributed risks, we exploit the argument of asymptotic normality to derive optimal two-parameter layer contracts. Finally, numerical applications are considered in a two-insurer setting to illustrate the influence of the dependence structures and heterogeneous risk tolerances on optimal strategies and the corresponding risk evaluation.