Publish Your Threat Models! The benefits far outweigh the dangers

2025-11-11

AI Summary

Current technology vendors commonly lack granular security disclosures, issuing only vague “security statements,” thereby impeding visibility and assurance across the software supply chain. Method: This paper introduces the Public Threat Model (PTM) paradigm—a systematic approach to enhance cross-organizational security transparency and collaborative defense. We design a PTM construction framework applicable to both open-source and commercial components, incorporating threat modeling, sensitive information anonymization, versioned updates, and regulatory compliance alignment. We further provide actionable publication guidelines and review procedures. Contribution/Results: Our work enables the transformation of proprietary internal threat models into standardized, verifiable, and integrable public assets. This empowers procuring organizations to rigorously assess security posture and allows vendors to differentiate through demonstrable security capabilities—establishing a novel, practice-grounded paradigm for building trustworthy software supply chains.

Technology Category

• Application Domains: Security
• Computer Vision: Interpretability, Explainability, and Transparency
• Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization: Satisfiability Modulo Theories

Application Category

• Security and Privacy: Data transparency and provenance
• User Modeling, Personalization and Recommendation: Attacks and countermeasures in recommendation systems
• Semantics and Knowledge: Provenance, trust, security and privacy, and ethical issues in managing semantic data

Abstract

Threat modeling has long guided software development work, and we consider how Public Threat Models (PTM) can convey useful security information to others. We list some early adopter precedents, explain the many benefits, address potential objections, and cite regulatory drivers. Internal threat models may not be directly suitable for disclosure so we provide guidance for redaction and review, as well as when to update models (published or not). In a concluding call to action, we encourage the technology community to openly share their PTMs so the security properties of each component are known up and down the supply chain. Technology providers proud of their security efforts can show their work for competitive advantage, and customers can ask for and evaluate PTMs rather than be told"it's secure"but little more. Many great products already have fine threat models, and turning those into PTMs is a relatively minor task, so we argue this should (and easily could) become the new norm.

Problem

• Promoting public disclosure of threat models for security transparency
• Addressing objections and providing guidance for threat model publication
• Enabling supply chain security evaluation through shared threat models

Innovation

• Publishing Public Threat Models openly
• Providing redaction and review guidance
• Encouraging PTM sharing across supply chain