π€ AI Summary
This work addresses the vulnerability of traditional verifiable secret sharing (VSS) to quantum attacks, which undermines its long-term binding security. To resolve this, the authors propose Proof in a Bottle (PiB), a novel scheme that decouples verifiability from long-term binding. PiB leverages pre-quantum Pedersen commitments to enable real-time zero-knowledge verification while deferring binding to the post-quantum era through a βcommit now, reveal laterβ mechanism. Specifically, binding information is encoded as salted hashes and immutably anchored to a public ledger, ensuring that secrets distributed by honest parties today remain both secure and recoverable even in the presence of future quantum adversaries. This approach preserves the immediate integrity of VSS while guaranteeing long-term availability and security against quantum threats.
π Abstract
Traditional secret sharing techniques such as Verifiable Secret sharing (VSS) are vulnerable to quantum attacks by a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC) running Shor's algorithm. We observe that the binding a VSS needs is required only at the moment of dealing, and this binding can be made before any CRQC exists. We propose Proof in a Bottle (PiB), which decouples verifiability from long-term binding: standard Pedersen commitments provide zero-knowledge, publicly checkable consistency during a pre-quantum window, while a salted, index-bound hash of the share set, anchored to an immutable public ledger, preserves the binding established in that window into the post-quantum era. The guarantee is explicitly a commit-now, reveal-later one: it protects today's honest dealings against tomorrow's quantum adversary.