Evolutionary Dynamics Based on Reputation in Networked Populations with Game Transitions

2025-12-04

AI Summary

This study investigates the synergistic effects of reputation mechanisms and dynamic game switching on the evolution of cooperation in networked populations. Method: We propose a fitness function integrating individual payoffs with neighbors’ cooperation levels (serving as a reputation proxy) and design a dual-path game-switching mechanism driven by both behavioral adaptation and environmental perturbation. Extensive simulations of the donation game are conducted on regular lattice, random, and scale-free networks. Contribution/Results: Crucially, on lattice networks, unidirectional enhancement of reputation paradoxically suppresses cooperation—revealing nonlinear regulatory roles of reputation feedback and environmental variation in cooperative evolution. Our model significantly elevates steady-state cooperation levels across diverse topologies. It provides a novel mechanistic explanation for the emergence of prosocial behavior and establishes a computationally tractable framework for studying cooperation dynamics in structured populations.

Technology Category

• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Cooperative Game Theory
• Multiagent Systems: Mechanism Design
• Cognitive Modeling & Cognitive Systems: Social Cognition And Interaction

Application Category

• Social Networks and Social Media: Media and governance, opinion dynamics, filter bubbles, polarization
• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Incentives in network design for Web infrastructures and ecosystems
• Web Mining and Content Analysis: Models for Web evolution

Abstract

The environment undergoes perpetual changes that are influenced by a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. Consequently, it exerts a substantial influence on an individual's physical and psychological state, directly or indirectly affecting the evolutionary dynamics of a population described by a network, which in turn can also alter the environment. Furthermore, the evolution of strategies, shaped by reputation, can diverge due to variations in multiple factors. To explore the potential consequences of the mentioned situations, this paper studies how game and reputation dynamics alter the evolution of cooperation. Concretely, game transitions are determined by individuals' behaviors and external uncontrollable factors. The cooperation level of its neighbors reflects individuals' reputation, and further, a general fitness function regarding payoff and reputation is provided. Within the context of the donation game, we investigate the relevant outcomes associated with the aforementioned evolutionary process, considering various topologies for distinct interactions. Additionally, a biased mutation is introduced to gain a deeper insight into the strategy evolution. We detect a substantial increase in the cooperation level through intensive simulations, and some important phenomena are observed, e.g., the unilateral increase of the value of prosocial behavior limits promotion in cooperative behavior in square-lattice networks.

Problem

• Studies how game and reputation dynamics affect cooperation evolution
• Examines game transitions driven by behavior and external factors
• Investigates cooperation levels across different network topologies

Innovation

• Game transitions based on behavior and external factors
• Reputation measured by neighbors' cooperation levels
• Fitness function combining payoff and reputation