Radio-Frequency Side-Channel Analysis of a Trapped-Ion Quantum Computer

2026-03-06

AI Summary

This work reveals, for the first time, that radio-frequency (RF) signal leakage from acousto-optic modulators in trapped-ion quantum computers constitutes a novel side-channel threat to the confidentiality of proprietary quantum algorithms. By capturing this RF leakage using commercial off-the-shelf equipment and applying signal processing techniques alongside pulse feature extraction, the authors successfully reconstructed control pulse parameters for both single-qubit operations and entangling gates. The feasibility of this side-channel attack was experimentally demonstrated on a commercial qudit-based ion-trap processor, establishing RF modulation signals as a previously unrecognized hardware vulnerability in quantum computing systems. This finding provides a new perspective for the security-aware design of quantum hardware and underscores the need to consider electromagnetic emanations in quantum information protection strategies.

Technology Category

• Machine Learning: Quantum Machine Learning
• Computer Vision: Adversarial Attacks & Robustness
• Philosophy and Ethics of AI: Privacy & Security

Application Category

• Security and Privacy: Large-scale security measurements
• User Modeling, Personalization and Recommendation: Attacks and countermeasures in recommendation systems
• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Trust and reliance of crowd workers and data experts on GenAI

Abstract

Analogously to classical computers, quantum processors exhibit side channels that may give attackers access to potentially proprietary algorithms. We identify and exploit a previously unexplored side channel in trapped-ion quantum processors that arises from the radio-frequency (RF) signals used to modulate lasers for ion cooling, gate execution, and readout. In these quantum processors, acousto-optical modulators (AOMs) imprint phase and frequency modulations onto laser fields interacting with the ions to implement individual and collective unitaries. The AOMs are driven by strong RF signals, a fraction of which leaks out of the device. We discuss general strategies to exploit this side channel and demonstrate how to detect RF leakage from a state-of-the-art qudit-based quantum processor using off-the-shelf components. From this data, we extract pulse characteristics of single-ion and entangling gates, thereby implementing a proof-of-principle exploitation of the novel attack vector. Finally, we outline ways to mitigate the information leakage through the presented side channel.

Problem

• side-channel
• trapped-ion quantum computer
• radio-frequency leakage
• quantum security
• acousto-optical modulator

Innovation

• radio-frequency side channel
• trapped-ion quantum computer
• acousto-optical modulator
• quantum side-channel attack
• qudit processor