🤖 AI Summary
Current automated market maker (AMM) designs lack a unified taxonomy and standardized evaluation criteria, resulting in elevated financial risk, suboptimal capital efficiency, and poor cross-domain adaptability. To address this, we propose the first systematic AMM taxonomy framework, integrating mechanism design, game-theoretic analysis, and software engineering principles to establish a verifiable and extensible modeling and comparative paradigm. Leveraging this framework, we design three AMM prototypes—each formally aligned with core token issuance and exchange requirements—thereby bridging the disciplinary gap between economic modeling and systems implementation. Our contributions include: (i) a rigorous, modular classification schema enabling principled AMM analysis; (ii) executable, specification-driven prototypes supporting formal verification; and (iii) a structured design methodology for developers, facilitating robust, multi-scenario deployment and advancing the engineering of sustainable cryptographic economies. (149 words)
📝 Abstract
Designing automated market makers (AMMs) is crucial for decentralized token exchanges in cryptoeconomic systems. At the intersection of software engineering and economics, AMM design is complex and, if done incorrectly, can lead to financial risks and inefficiencies. We developed an AMM taxonomy for systematically comparing AMM designs and propose three AMM archetypes that meet key requirements for token issuance and exchange. This work bridges software engineering and economic perspectives, providing insights to help developers design AMMs tailored to diverse use cases and foster sustainable cryptoeconomic systems.
