Problem
Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.
BGP hijacking
incentive misalignment
RPKI/ROV
BGPay: An Incentive-Compatible Mechanism for BGP Hijack Filtering
🤖 AI Summary
为解决BGP劫持过滤中的激励错位问题，提出BGPay机制，通过市场手段让前缀所有者设立悬赏金，鼓励网络过滤恶意公告，并基于公开路由收集器的数据设计了托管协议。
📝 Abstract
BGP hijacking remains a persistent threat as existing defenses, including RPKI/ROV suffer from a fundamental incentive misalignment: the networks best positioned to filter malicious announcements bear operational costs but receive no direct benefit, while the victim prefix owner captures all the value. We advocate a market-based alternative in which prefix owners post standing bounties for filtering invalid announcements of their prefixes, turning filtering from altruism into a private transaction. Our insight is that neither a propagating hijack nor its absence can hide from public route collectors, whose committed routing tables could become an independent root of trust for releasing funds of the bounty. We build on this insight to design BGPay, an escrow protocol in which filterers and monitors commit before either reveals, and a smart contract pays out on evidence rather than on the prefix owner's judgment. Analyzing 1K real hijack incidents, we find that today's collectors already provide enough visibility where it matters: ASes that are more important for containing the hijack are also highly visible from the public monitors. Hence, setting rewards proportionately to containment impact discourages misbehavior.
Innovation
Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.
incentive-compatible mechanism
BGP hijack filtering
escrow protocol
smart contract
public route collectors
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