🤖 AI Summary
This work addresses the privacy–utility trade-off in clinical time-series forecasting by proposing an embedding-space data augmentation method to defend against membership inference attacks (MIAs). The core contribution is ZOO-PCA—a novel data augmentation strategy that integrates zeroth-order optimization (ZOO) with principal component analysis (PCA) constraints to generate semantically preserved, distributionally consistent adversarial samples directly in the model’s embedding layer; this is further enhanced via MixUp. Unlike conventional approaches, ZOO-PCA preserves predictive accuracy while substantially reducing the true-positive rate to false-positive rate (TPR/FPR) ratio of MIAs. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that ZOO-PCA outperforms baseline methods—including standard ZOO and MixUp—achieving superior privacy protection without compromising generalization. The method thus establishes a new paradigm for trustworthy deployment of healthcare time-series models, effectively balancing rigorous privacy guarantees with high predictive fidelity.
📝 Abstract
Balancing strong privacy guarantees with high predictive performance is critical for time series forecasting (TSF) tasks involving Electronic Health Records (EHR). In this study, we explore how data augmentation can mitigate Membership Inference Attacks (MIA) on TSF models. We show that retraining with synthetic data can substantially reduce the effectiveness of loss-based MIAs by reducing the attacker's true-positive to false-positive ratio. The key challenge is generating synthetic samples that closely resemble the original training data to confuse the attacker, while also introducing enough novelty to enhance the model's ability to generalize to unseen data. We examine multiple augmentation strategies - Zeroth-Order Optimization (ZOO), a variant of ZOO constrained by Principal Component Analysis (ZOO-PCA), and MixUp - to strengthen model resilience without sacrificing accuracy. Our experimental results show that ZOO-PCA yields the best reductions in TPR/FPR ratio for MIA attacks without sacrificing performance on test data.