Stackelberg Game-Driven Defense for ISAC Against Channel Attacks in Low-Altitude Networks

2025-11-09

AI Summary

To address the vulnerability of Integrated Sensing and Communication (ISAC) systems in low-altitude networks to channel access attacks—leading to degraded performance and security risks—this paper proposes an active defense framework based on a three-party Stackelberg game, where the malicious attacker acts as the leader and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and base stations serve as cooperative followers. A joint communication-sensing performance metric is formulated, and the game equilibrium is derived via backward induction to obtain dynamic optimal defense strategies. Our key contributions include: (i) the first application of a two-follower Stackelberg structure to low-altitude ISAC security mechanisms; and (ii) the integration of performance quantification with convergence analysis. Simulation results demonstrate rapid convergence of the proposed algorithm, significantly enhanced attack resilience, and superior performance over baseline methods in latency, sensing accuracy, and communication reliability—thereby ensuring trustworthy ISAC operation for critical low-altitude applications.

Technology Category

• Multiagent Systems: Adversarial Agents
• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Adversarial Learning
• Search and Optimization: Adversarial Search

Application Category

• Security and Privacy: Large-scale security measurements
• User Modeling, Personalization and Recommendation: Attacks and countermeasures in recommendation systems
• Systems and Infrastructure for Web, Mobile and WoT: Location- and context-aware Web and WoT applications and services

Abstract

The increasing saturation of terrestrial resources has driven economic activities into low-altitude airspace. These activities, such as air taxis, rely on low-altitude wireless networks, and one key enabling technology is integrated sensing and communication (ISAC). However, in low-altitude airspace, ISAC is vulnerable to channel-access attacks, thereby degrading performance and threatening safety. To address this, we propose a defense framework based on a Stackelberg game. Specifically, we first model the system under attack, deriving metrics for the communication and the sensing to quantify performance. Then, we formulate the interaction as a three-player game where a malicious attacker acts as the leader, while the legitimate drone and ground base station act as followers. Using a backward induction algorithm, we obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium, allowing the defenders to dynamically adjust their strategies to mitigate the attack. Simulation results verify that the proposed algorithm converges to a stable solution and outperforms existing baselines, ensuring reliable ISAC performance for critical low-altitude applications.

Problem

• Defending ISAC systems against channel-access attacks in low-altitude networks
• Modeling attacker-defender interactions using a three-player Stackelberg game
• Dynamically adjusting strategies to ensure reliable communication and sensing performance

Innovation

• Defense framework based on Stackelberg game
• Three-player game modeling with backward induction
• Dynamic strategy adjustment for attack mitigation