Coordinated Position Falsification Attacks and Countermeasures for Location-Based Services

📅 2025-10-31
📈 Citations: 0
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🤖 AI Summary
Location-based services (LBS) are vulnerable to low-cost attacks—including Wi-Fi spoofing and GNSS jamming—as well as coordinated position-spoofing threats. To address this, we propose a proactive defense framework based on redundant multi-source localization fusion. Our approach innovatively extends the Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) paradigm by integrating heterogeneous signals—namely GNSS, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular, IP geolocation databases, and in-vehicle sensors—into a cross-modal integrity verification mechanism. Crucially, it requires no additional hardware, leveraging only existing platform sensing capabilities. This design significantly enhances robustness against sophisticated spoofing attacks and improves trustworthy position recovery accuracy. Experimental evaluation demonstrates up to a 62% improvement in attack detection accuracy over baseline methods, alongside effective reconstruction of verifiable positions. The solution offers a lightweight, deployable integrity assurance mechanism for real-world LBS systems.

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📝 Abstract
With the rise of location-based service (LBS) applications that rely on terrestrial and satellite infrastructures (e.g., GNSS and crowd-sourced Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular, and IP databases) for positioning, ensuring their integrity and security is paramount. However, we demonstrate that these applications are susceptible to low-cost attacks (less than $50), including Wi-Fi spoofing combined with GNSS jamming, as well as more sophisticated coordinated location spoofing. These attacks manipulate position data to control or undermine LBS functionality, leading to user scams or service manipulation. Therefore, we propose a countermeasure to detect and thwart such attacks by utilizing readily available, redundant positioning information from off-the-shelf platforms. Our method extends the receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) framework by incorporating opportunistic information, including data from onboard sensors and terrestrial infrastructure signals, and, naturally, GNSS. We theoretically show that the fusion of heterogeneous signals improves resilience against sophisticated adversaries on multiple fronts. Experimental evaluations show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in improving detection accuracy by 62% at most compared to baseline schemes and restoring accurate positioning.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

Detecting coordinated location spoofing attacks on LBS
Countering low-cost attacks manipulating position data
Improving resilience against adversarial positioning manipulation
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

Extends RAIM framework with opportunistic sensor data
Fuses heterogeneous signals for improved attack resilience
Uses redundant positioning to detect location spoofing attacks
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Wenjie Liu
Networked Systems Security Group, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 114 28 Stockholm, Sweden
Panos Papadimitratos
Panos Papadimitratos
KTH (Royal Institute of Technology)
SecurityPrivacyNetworkingWireless communications