🤖 AI Summary
This paper addresses the epistemic legitimacy crisis confronting post-hoc explanation methods in scientific AI, arising from the fundamental tension between model complexity and human comprehensibility. Method: It introduces “Computational Interpretivism” (CI)—a novel philosophical framework that analogizes post-hoc rationalizations to expert human cognition, grounding scientific explanation in the normative concepts of *mediated understanding* and *bounded truthfulness*. Integrating analysis from philosophy of science, epistemic modeling, and empirical validation, the paper develops operational criteria for evaluating post-hoc explanations. Contribution/Results: It demonstrates that empirically warranted post-hoc explanations—without requiring full mechanistic transparency—can yield epistemically legitimate scientific insights, thereby bridging the gap between black-box models and scientific understanding. The core innovation lies in providing both a systematic philosophical justification for post-hoc interpretability and a practical, empirically grounded assessment pathway.
📝 Abstract
The widespread adoption of machine learning in scientific research has created a fundamental tension between model opacity and scientific understanding. Whilst some advocate for intrinsically interpretable models, we introduce Computational Interpretabilism (CI) as a philosophical framework for post-hoc interpretability in scientific AI. Drawing parallels with human expertise, where post-hoc rationalisation coexists with reliable performance, CI establishes that scientific knowledge emerges through structured model interpretation when properly bounded by empirical validation. Through mediated understanding and bounded factivity, we demonstrate how post-hoc methods achieve epistemically justified insights without requiring complete mechanical transparency, resolving tensions between model complexity and scientific comprehension.