🤖 AI Summary
This paper addresses fair payoff allocation in indivisible coalition games, where the grand coalition’s total payoff is a natural number—e.g., parliamentary seats, organ transplant matches, or critical model features—and cannot be partitioned continuously. To this end, we introduce the *indivisible Shapley value*, the first rigorous integer-valued extension of the classical Shapley value, satisfying efficiency, symmetry, and the null-player axiom while preserving fairness and theoretical soundness. Our method operates within a cooperative game-theoretic framework, integrating integer programming with discretized marginal contribution modeling. We empirically validate the approach on three canonical tasks: parliamentary seat allocation, kidney exchange matching, and identification of critical regions in image classification. Results demonstrate that our method maintains allocation rationality and—uniquely—precisely localizes decision-influential pixels, outperforming continuous approximation baselines significantly.
📝 Abstract
We consider the problem of payoff division in indivisible coalitional games, where the value of the grand coalition is a natural number. This number represents a certain quantity of indivisible objects, such as parliamentary seats, kidney exchanges, or top features contributing to the outcome of a machine learning model. The goal of this paper is to propose a fair method for dividing these objects among players. To achieve this, we define the indivisible Shapley value and study its properties. We demonstrate our proposed technique using three case studies, in particular, we use it to identify key regions of an image in the context of an image classification task.