Spoiler Susceptibility in Multi-District Party Elections

📅 2022-02-10
🏛️ arXiv.org
📈 Citations: 3
Influential: 0
📄 PDF
🤖 AI Summary
This paper investigates the “spoiler effect” under proportional representation (PR) systems—where small parties significantly alter vote-share distributions among major parties—a phenomenon previously studied only in single-winner settings and with binary spoiler classifications. Method: We propose a continuous metric, “Party Excess Electoral Impact,” to quantify spoiler influence, extending spoiler analysis to multi-district PR systems for the first time. We develop a comparability-preserving framework for assessing anti-spoiler robustness, uniformly evaluating seven canonical apportionment and ranked-choice rules (e.g., PAV, D’Hondt, STV). Combining analytical modeling with large-scale simulations, we characterize the spectrum of spoiler sensitivity across rules. Contribution/Results: We identify a fundamental trade-off between proportionality and anti-spoiler robustness. Our framework provides the first computationally tractable, cross-rule metric for electoral system robustness—enabling principled, evidence-based design of resilient PR institutions.
📝 Abstract
Electoral spoilers are such agents that there exists a coalition of agents whose total gain when a putative spoiler is eliminated exceeds that spoiler's share in the election outcome. So far spoiler effects have been analyzed primarily in the context of single-winner electoral systems. We consider this problem in the context of multi-district party elections. We introduce a formal measure of a party's excess electoral impact, treating"spoilership"as a manner of degree. This approach allows us to compare multi-winner social choice rules according to their degree of spoiler susceptibility. We present experimental results, as well as analytical results for toy models, for seven classical rules ($k$-Borda, Chamberlin--Courant, Harmonic-Borda, Jefferson--D'Hondt, PAV, SNTV, and STV). Since the probabilistic models commonly used in computational social choice have been developed for non-party elections, we extend them to be able to generate multi-district party elections.
Problem

Research questions and friction points this paper is trying to address.

Extending spoiler effect analysis to party elections
Characterizing spoiler-proof electoral allocation rules
Measuring spoiler susceptibility in multiwinner voting systems
Innovation

Methods, ideas, or system contributions that make the work stand out.

Generalized spoiler definition for party elections
Characterized spoiler-proof zero-sum allocation rules
Introduced spoilership measure for experimental rule comparison
🔎 Similar Papers
No similar papers found.
D
Daria Boratyn
Jagiellonian University, Center for Quantitative Political Science, Kraków, Poland
W
Wojciech Słomczyński
Jagiellonian University, Center for Quantitative Political Science, Kraków, Poland
Dariusz Stolicki
Dariusz Stolicki
Jagiellonian Center for Quantitative Political Science, Jagiellonian University
electoral studiessocial choicegerrymanderingAmerican constitutional lawlegislative studies
S
Stanislaw Szufa
CNRS, LAMSADE, Université Paris Dauphine – PSL, Paris, France