🤖 AI Summary
Hardware Trojan (HT) detection faces challenges including heavy reliance on manual feature engineering and poor model generalizability. To address these, this paper proposes an end-to-end detection framework synergistically driven by self-supervised learning and neural architecture search (NAS). First, self-supervised pretraining enables unsupervised, automated feature extraction from raw circuit representations. Subsequently, NAS dynamically discovers the optimal classifier architecture, which is then fine-tuned on downstream HT detection tasks to enhance task-specific adaptability. By eliminating handcrafted feature design, the method significantly improves robustness against diverse, stealthy, and previously unseen HTs. Evaluated on multiple benchmark circuit suites, the proposed approach achieves up to 18.3% higher detection accuracy than state-of-the-art methods, demonstrating superior generalization and detection capability.
📝 Abstract
The globalized semiconductor supply chain has made Hardware Trojans (HT) a significant security threat to embedded systems, necessitating the design of efficient and adaptable detection mechanisms. Despite promising machine learning-based HT detection techniques in the literature, they suffer from ad hoc feature selection and the lack of adaptivity, all of which hinder their effectiveness across diverse HT attacks. In this paper, we propose SAND, a selfsupervised and adaptive NAS-driven framework for efficient HT detection. Specifically, this paper makes three key contributions. (1) We leverage self-supervised learning (SSL) to enable automated feature extraction, eliminating the dependency on manually engineered features. (2) SAND integrates neural architecture search (NAS) to dynamically optimize the downstream classifier, allowing for seamless adaptation to unseen benchmarks with minimal fine-tuning. (3) Experimental results show that SAND achieves a significant improvement in detection accuracy (up to 18.3%) over state-of-the-art methods, exhibits high resilience against evasive Trojans, and demonstrates strong generalization.