$Proovarphi$: A ZKP Market Mechanism

2024-04-09

AI Summary

Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) generation incurs substantial computational overhead, necessitating efficient outsourcing mechanisms for applications such as ZK-Rollups; however, existing markets lack formal modeling and incentive guarantees. Method: We propose the first formal ZKP market model characterizing the interaction between users submitting proof tasks and provers bidding to generate proofs. We design $Proovarphi$, an incentive-compatible and budget-balanced auction mechanism inspired by the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) framework and integrated with cryptographic protocols. To enhance robustness, we systematically incorporate defenses against Sybil attacks, capacity overbidding, and collusion. Contribution/Results: We formally prove $Proovarphi$’s incentive compatibility and budget balance. Analysis demonstrates its effectiveness in mitigating multiple real-world security threats. Our work establishes the first deployable, robust market infrastructure for ZKP outsourcing, bridging a critical gap between theory and practice in verifiable computation markets.

Technology Category

• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Mechanism Design
• Data Mining & Knowledge Management: Representing, Reasoning, and Using Provenance, Trust
• Multiagent Systems: Mechanism Design

Application Category

• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Uses of LLMs and GenAI for marketplace design, bidding, and strategic interactions
• Security and Privacy: Data transparency and provenance
• Responsible Web: Data and user privacy-enhancing technologies for the Web

Abstract

Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are computationally demanding to generate. Their importance for applications like ZK-Rollups has prompted some to outsource ZKP generation to a market of specialized provers. However, existing market designs either do not fit the ZKP setting or lack formal description and analysis. In this work, we propose a formal ZKP market model that captures the interactions between users submitting ZKP tasks and provers competing to generate proofs. Building on this model, we introduce $Proovarphi$, an auction-based ZKP market mechanism. We prove that $Proovarphi$ is incentive compatible for users and provers, and budget balanced. We augment $Proovarphi$ with system-level designs to address the practical challenges of our setting, such as Sybil attacks, misreporting of prover capacity, and collusion. We analyze our system-level designs and show how they can mitigate the various security concerns.

Problem

• Designs a formal ZKP market model for user-prover interactions.
• Introduces an auction-based mechanism ensuring incentive compatibility and budget balance.
• Addresses practical challenges like Sybil attacks and prover capacity misreporting.

Innovation

• Formal ZKP market model for task-prover interactions
• Auction-based ZKP mechanism ensuring incentive compatibility
• System-level designs to mitigate security and collusion risks