🤖 AI Summary
Cryptographic security parameters—such as key length—lack an abstract, compositional characterization within resource theories, hindering rigorous, structural reasoning about security guarantees.
Method: We propose a parameterized iterative construction framework that intrinsically embeds security parameters into the compositional structure of resource theories. We instantiate it in the Markov category of probabilistic Boolean circuits, introduce asymptotic equivalence metrics, and employ string diagram syntax to enable diagrammatic reasoning.
Contribution/Results: This work is the first to unify cryptographic security parameters, negligibility, and structural resource-theoretic reasoning within a single formal model, enabling compositional, machine-verifiable proofs of security properties. We formally derive the negligibility of random key-guessing success probability, demonstrating the framework’s capacity to support automated, structured verification of cryptographic theorems.
📝 Abstract
Many algorithms are specified with respect to a fixed but unspecified parameter. Examples of this are especially common in cryptography, where protocols often feature a security parameter such as the bit length of a secret key.
Our aim is to capture this phenomenon in a more abstract setting. We focus on resource theories -- general calculi of processes with a string diagrammatic syntax -- introducing a general parametric iteration construction. By instantiating this construction within the Markov category of probabilistic Boolean circuits and equipping it with a suitable metric, we are able to capture the notion of negligibility via asymptotic equivalence, in a compositional way. This allows us to use diagrammatic reasoning to prove simple cryptographic theorems -- for instance, proving that guessing a randomly generated key has negligible success.