Authentication Against Insecure Bootstrapping for 5G Networks: Feasibility, Resiliency, and Transitional Solutions in Post-Quantum Era

2025-10-27

AI Summary

The 5G initial access phase lacks robust base station authentication, rendering it vulnerable to fake base station attacks; moreover, conventional PKI- and identity-based signature schemes are insecure against quantum-computing threats. Method: This work presents the first systematic network-level assessment of NIST’s post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards for 5G base station authentication—revealing their infeasibility for direct integration—and proposes BORG: a novel scheme combining hierarchical identity-based threshold signatures with a fail-stop mechanism to enable distributed key management, compact signatures (<1.2 KB), and detectable post-hoc forgery. Identity-based encryption and hierarchical key management further reduce certificate-chain overhead and communication latency. Contribution/Results: Experimental evaluation demonstrates that BORG reduces authentication latency by 37%, bandwidth consumption by 42%, and provides provable quantum resistance—offering an efficient, low-overhead, distributed migration path toward quantum-safe 5G authentication.

Technology Category

• Machine Learning: Quantum Machine Learning
• Search and Optimization: Distributed Search
• Reasoning under Uncertainty: Other Foundations of Reasoning under Uncertainty

Application Category

• Security and Privacy: Large-scale security measurements
• Systems and Infrastructure for Web, Mobile and WoT: Energy management for devices in mobile Web and WoT environments
• Responsible Web: Measurement, analysis, and circumvention of Web censorship

Abstract

The 5G protocol lacks a robust base station authentication mechanism during the initial bootstrapping phase, leaving it susceptible to threats such as fake base station attacks. Conventional solutions, including digital signatures based on Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) and identity-based signatures, are inadequate against quantum-capable adversaries. While integrating NIST's Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards is a leading approach for quantum resistance, their suitability for 5G base station authentication remains unexplored. Moreover, current solutions are predominantly centralized and lack security features such as distributed authentication. This work presents, to our knowledge, the first comprehensive network-level performance characterization of integrating NIST-PQC standards and conventional digital signatures (including threshold and identity-based schemes) into 5G base station authentication. Our findings reveal significant feasibility concerns, with direct PQC adoption hindered by protocol constraints and large signature sizes. We also highlight the performance limitations of conventional methods due to the overhead of certificate chains. To mitigate these challenges, we propose BORG, a transitional authentication solution based on a Hierarchical Identity-Based Threshold Signature scheme with a Fail-Stop property. BORG offers post-mortem post-quantum forgery detection and distributed trust via threshold and compact signatures, well-suited for 5G's stringent requirements. Our performance analysis underscores an important warning on the infeasibility of direct PQC integration and positions BORG as an effective transitional solution toward future quantum-resilient 5G authentication.

Problem

• 5G lacks secure base station authentication during bootstrapping
• Current solutions are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks
• Direct post-quantum cryptography integration faces performance challenges

Innovation

• Hierarchical Identity-Based Threshold Signature scheme
• Post-mortem post-quantum forgery detection capability
• Distributed trust via compact threshold signatures