Computational Foundations for Strategic Coopetition: Formalizing Interdependence and Complementarity

2025-10-21

AI Summary

Existing modeling languages (e.g., i*) lack quantitative formalization of the dynamic trade-offs between value creation and appropriation in strategic co-opetition, while game-theoretic approaches struggle to embed context-dependent structural dependencies. Method: We propose the first computational framework integrating i* and game theory: structural dependencies in i* are formalized as quantifiable interdependence coefficients; complementarity is modeled via Added Value theory; and structural interdependence is endogenized within Nash equilibrium—unifying qualitative reasoning with quantitative analysis. Innovatively, we construct parameterized value functions (power/logarithmic forms) and introduce a structured translation framework enabling empirical mapping. Contribution/Results: Applied to the Samsung–Sony S-LCD case, the logarithmic specification achieves a validation score of 45/60, demonstrating both strong goodness-of-fit and theoretical tractability. This work establishes a novel paradigm for modeling co-opetitive systems, bridging conceptual modeling and rigorous strategic analysis.

Technology Category

• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Cooperative Game Theory
• Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization: Satisfiability Modulo Theories
• Cognitive Modeling & Cognitive Systems: Computational Creativity

Application Category

• Economics, Online Markets and Human Computation: Incentives in network design for Web infrastructures and ecosystems
• Graph Algorithms and Modeling for the Web: Algorithms and analysis for incomplete, noisy, or partially observed Web-related graphs
• Semantics and Knowledge: Methods to enhance, augment, integrate or synergize semantic models such as knowledge graphs and LLMs

Abstract

Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition where actors simultaneously cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages like i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This technical report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients through a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines comprehensive experimental testing across power and logarithmic value function specifications, demonstrating functional form robustness, with empirical application to the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011), where logarithmic specifications achieve superior empirical fit (validation score 45/60) while power functions provide theoretical tractability. This technical report serves as the foundational reference for a coordinated research program examining strategic coopetition in requirements engineering and multi-agent systems, with companion work addressing trust dynamics, team production, and reciprocity mechanisms.

Problem

• Formalizing strategic interdependence through quantitative dependency coefficients
• Modeling complementarity using game-theoretic value creation frameworks
• Integrating structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation

Innovation

• Formalizes interdependence via i* structural dependency coefficients
• Models complementarity using Added Value concept parameterization
• Integrates structural dependencies with Nash Equilibrium bargaining power